2018 Leet Symposium: Fiduciary Duty Corporate Goals, and Shareholder Activism—Introduction by Korsmo, Charles R.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
2019 
2018 Leet Symposium: Fiduciary Duty Corporate Goals, and 
Shareholder Activism—Introduction 
Charles R. Korsmo 
Case Western University School of Law, crk64@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Korsmo, Charles R., "2018 Leet Symposium: Fiduciary Duty Corporate Goals, and Shareholder 
Activism—Introduction" (2019). Faculty Publications. 2088. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/2088 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 4·2019 
843 
2018 Leet Symposium: Fiduciary 
Duty, Corporate Goals, and 
Shareholder Activism 
Introduction 
Charles R. Korsmo† 
The debate over the proper purposes of the public corporation 
extends back to the very dawn of modern corporate law. Way back in 
1932,1 Columbia Law Professor Adolf Berle and Harvard Law Professor 
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. engaged in a famous debate in the pages of the 
Harvard Law Review over what has come to be called corporate social 
responsibility. The prior year, Berle had published a now-classic article 
analogizing corporate managers to trustees, bound by fiduciary 
obligation to use their powers to benefit the shareholders.2 To put it in 
modern terms, Berle argued that the sole governing norm of corporate 
decision-making is, and ought to be, shareholder wealth maximization.3 
In response, Dodd penned an article arguing for a broader 
conception of the duties of corporate managers—what would now be 
called a stakeholder model of corporate governance.4 Dodd suggested 
that the law permitted—and ought to encourage—corporate managers, 
as holders of a public charter endowed with great power, to take into 
account the interests of “employees, consumers, and the general public, 
as well as of the stockholders.”5 He further argued—or perhaps 
threatened—that the failure of corporations voluntarily to act in a 
 
†  Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
1. The year 1932 has as good a claim as any to being the birthdate of modern 
American corporate law, as it was the year Adolf Berle, Jr. and Gardiner 
Means published their foundational text, Adolf Berle, Jr. & 
Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (1932). 
2. A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 
1049 (1931). 
3. See id. at 1049 (“It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a 
corporation or to the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily 
and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the 
shareholders as their interest appears.”). An early version of this view was 
famously advanced in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668 
(Mich. 1919). 
4. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1156 (1932). 
5. Id. 
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public-spirited fashion would inevitably lead public opinion to demand 
coercive government intervention.6 
Berle’s response was caustic.7 Berle expressed his sympathy with 
the “dream of a time when corporate administration will be held to a 
high degree of required responsibility.”8 Nonetheless, he argued that 
granting corporate managers discretion to serve the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies would, in practice, simply be giving them 
license to favor one constituency above all others: themselves.9 It was, 
Berle suggested, naïve in the extreme to expect that weakening the 
norm of stockholder wealth maximization would lead to social 
responsibility, rather than a managerial kleptocracy.10 
The Berle-Dodd debate presaged many—if not most—of the issues 
that have constituted the corporate responsibility debate over the 
ensuing decades. Does relaxing the norm of shareholder wealth 
maximization free corporate managers to take other interests into 
account—such as employees, consumers, and the environment? Or does 
it merely give managers cover to serve their own self-interest? To what 
extent do “social responsibility” and shareholder wealth maximization 
really conflict?11 Where they do conflict, is any goal other than 
 
6. See id. at 1151 (suggesting that “the day may not be far distant when 
public opinion will demand a much greater degree of protection to the 
worker”); id. at 1153 (forecasting “legal compulsion . . . to keep those who 
failed to catch the new spirit up to the standards which their more 
enlightened competitors would desire to adopt voluntarily”); id. at 1158–
59 (noting that public benefits not provided by private enterprise instead 
“might be undertaken as a public enterprise supported by taxation”). 
7. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 
45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932). 
8. Id. at 1372. 
9. See id. at 1367 (“When the fiduciary obligation of the corporate 
management and ‘control’ to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the 
management and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute. The 
claims upon the assembled industrial wealth . . . which managements are 
likely to enforce (they have no need to urge) are their own.”). 
10. See id. (“Now I submit that you cannot abandon emphasis on ‘the view 
that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for 
their stockholders’ until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and 
reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.”). 
11. Dodd suggested that “social responsibility” included much that was 
compatible with shareholder wealth maximization, but also went beyond 
it: 
If the social responsibility of business means merely a more 
enlightened view as to the ultimate advantage of the stockholder-
owners, then obviously corporate managers may accept such social 
responsibility without any departure from the traditional view 
that their function is to seek to obtain the maximum amount of 
profits for their shareholders. 
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shareholder wealth maximization compatible with the fact that 
shareholders alone elect the board of directors?12 As is shown by the 
Articles in this issue, these questions are still with us eighty-seven  years 
later. 
And yet, as Professor Lipton notes in her contribution to this 
volume, “the theoretical question of the nature of directors’ duties 
continues to fascinate.”13 In part, this is due to the rich ironies that 
abound in the debate. On the one hand, advocates of corporate social 
responsibility—often otherwise suspicious of the motives of big 
business—would, in practice, entrust the handling of important social 
problems to the tender mercies of the managers of big businesses. On 
the other hand, libertarian Milton Friedman famously argued that 
businesses should focus exclusively on maximizing profits while 
operating within the law, while reserving entirely to the government—
an entity he did not generally hold in high esteem—the role of crafting 
rules to promote social welfare.14 
In part, the continuing fascination may stem from the recurring 
idea that changing circumstances are making a robust notion of 
corporate social responsibility more practical than it once may have 
been. Perhaps a consumer base increasingly attuned to environmental 
and social issues has narrowed the gap between “responsibility” and 
shareholder wealth maximization. Perhaps shareholders themselves are 
more willing than previously to leave money on the table to pursue 
other social ends, provided corporations disclose the information 
 
And yet one need not be unduly credulous to feel that there is 
more to this talk of social responsibility on the part of corporation 
managers than merely a more intelligent appreciation of what 
tends to the ultimate benefit of their stockholders. 
 Dodd, supra note 4, at 1156–57. 
12. See, e.g., 3 Henry G. Manne, First Lecture, in The Collected Works 
of Henry G. Manne: Liberty and Freedom in the Economic 
Ordering of Society, 15–16 (Fred S. McChesney & Jonathan R. Macey 
eds., 2009) (arguing that “socially responsible” actions that reduce 
shareholder wealth will be constrained by shareholder voting and the 
market for corporate control). 
13. Ann M. Lipton, What We Talk About When We Talk About Shareholder 
Primacy, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 863 (2019). 
14. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase 
its Profits, N.Y. Times Mag. (Sept. 13, 1970). In fairness to Friedman, 
he rejects the intrusion of “social responsibility” into the corporate 
boardroom—in favor of relegating it to the government—on the grounds 
that doing otherwise would inevitably lead to political intrusion into 
private enterprise. See id. at 3 (arguing that “the doctrine of ‘social 
responsibility’ involves the acceptance of the socialist view that political 
mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the appropriate way to 
determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 4·2019 
2018 Leet Symposium Introduction 
846 
necessary for them to do so effectively. Perhaps shareholders are simply 
better able to express and enforce their desire for socially responsible 
governance via activist funds or the managers of the large index funds 
that increasingly dominate markets.15 Perhaps fiduciary duty law has 
developed to the point where it can protect shareholders from self-
interested behavior by corporate managers while still allowing those 
managers discretion to achieve social goals not obviously linked to 
shareholder wealth maximization. 
In part, though, the enduring fascination with corporate social 
responsibility may simply reflect the profound fundamental issues at 
stake. None is more fundamental than that no economic system can 
long survive in a free society unless that system benefits—and is 
understood to benefit—the bulk of the populace. Writing in the first 
half of the twentieth century, both Dodd and Berle had this reality 
front of mind.16 We may have occasion to be reminded of it in the first 
half of the twenty-first century. 
On November 1, 2018, the Case Western Reserve University Law 
Review held the 2018 Leet Symposium, bringing together a group of 
nationally respected corporate law scholars to explore the current state 
of play between traditional shareholder wealth maximization and 
modern shareholder environmental and social activism. The Symposium 
 
15. Larry Fink, the head of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, has 
been clearest in positioning his fund to appeal to such investors. In his 
January 2018 annual letter to companies in which BlackRock invests, he 
emphasized that “[t]o prosper over time, every company must not only 
deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive 
contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, 
including shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in 
which they operate.” Annual Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief 
Exec. Officer, BlackRock, Inc., to Chief Exec. Officers (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-
letter [perma.cc/ZKG7-7XDB]; see also Leslie P. Norton, Blackrock’s 
Larry Fink: The New Conscience of Wall Street?, Barron’s (June 23, 
2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/in-defense-of-social-purpose-
1529716548 [http://perma.cc/3ZF3-3BM3]. 
16. See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 4, at 1151–52 (noting that belief in the 
inevitability of government control of the economy “is no longer confined 
to radical opponents of the capitalistic system; it has come to be shared 
by many conservatives who believe that capitalism is worth saving but 
that it can not permanently survive under modern conditions unless it 
treats the economic security of the worker as one of its obligations and is 
intelligently directed so as to attain that object”); Berle, supra note 7, at 
1368 (“Either you have a system based on individual ownership of 
property or you do not. If not—and there are at the moment plenty of 
reasons why capitalism does not seem ideal—it becomes necessary to 
present a system . . . of law or government, or both, by which 
responsibility for control of national wealth and income is so apportioned 
and enforced that the community as a whole, or at least the great bulk of 
it, is properly taken care of.”). 
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also included a panel on the difficult role of in-house corporate counsel 
in a world where serving as a zealous advocate for the corporation may 
conflict with in-house counsel’s compliance function. This issue contains 
Articles that were presented on the occasion, together with the prepared 
remarks of the keynote speaker, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce. 
Professor Ann Lipton, a corporate law scholar at Tulane Law 
School, asks the fundamental question of whether corporate purpose is 
determined by the shareholders themselves, or imposed by the law. If 
it is the former, she argues, there is reason to believe that shareholders 
would not uniformly choose a corporate purpose of maximizing long-
term shareholder wealth, even at the expense of other social goals. If 
the latter—and she catalogues several features of positive law that at 
the very least presume a purpose of shareholder wealth maximization—
the role of shareholders in corporate governance becomes decidedly 
murky. She concludes by suggesting that increasing shareholder 
assertiveness may heighten the tension between actual, expressed 
shareholder preferences and what the law has long presumed those 
preferences to be.17 
Professor Claire Hill, a corporate law scholar at the University of 
Minnesota Law School, argues that we may be seeing a convergence 
between the goals of corporate social responsibility and profit 
maximization. She argues that reputational concerns in product, labor, 
and financial markets, together with the potential for legal liability for 
bad behavior, render the tension between responsible corporate 
behavior and profit maximization less acute than it may seem. Professor 
Hill uses the example of the #MeToo movement and corporate efforts 
to prevent and respond to sexual misconduct to demonstrate that the 
line between social responsibility and wealth maximization is often 
unclear.18 
Andy Green, managing director of economic policy at the Center 
for American Progress, also argues that the perceived trade-off between 
wealth maximization and social responsibility is overstated. In his 
Article, he suggests that environmental, social, and governance issues 
often go to the heart of the systemic risks firms face, and that long-
term investors would benefit from expanded SEC-mandated disclosure 
of information pertinent to such issues.19 
In her prepared remarks, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce—our 
keynote speaker—argued against an extension of mandatory disclosure 
to matters not directly relevant to financial performance. She pointed 
 
17. Lipton, supra note 13. 
18. Claire A. Hill, #MeToo and the Convergence of CSR and Profit 
Maximization, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 895 (2019). 
19. Andy Green, Making Capital Market Work for Workers, Investors, and 
the Public: ESG Disclosure and Corporate Long-Termism, 69 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 909 (2019). 
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out the difficulty surrounding the definition of “material” information 
even in the narrow context of financial information, and the 
compounding of that difficulty if disclosure were extended to broader 
classes of information. She also emphasized the costs associated with 
broader disclosure and the possibility that expanded non-financial 
disclosure would interfere with one of the primary purposes of our 
capital markets—the efficient allocation of capital to productive 
endeavors.20 
Professor Sean Griffith, a corporate law scholar at Fordham 
University School of Law, comes at the Symposium topic from a 
different angle, examining shareholder suits challenging merger 
transactions. In particular, Professor Griffith examines how plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have innovated in the face of case law developments that have 
made it more difficult to bring and settle disclosure-based lawsuits in 
Delaware, the leading corporate law jurisdiction.21 
Finally, this issue contains two Articles on the role of in-house 
counsel. In the first, Professors Sally and Hugh Gunz explain the 
difficult position of the in-house counsel—a professional bound by 
professional rules of ethical conduct, but operating under the authority 
of non-professional business managers not similarly bound. They then 
explore the interaction between how in-house counsel perceive 
themselves and how they ultimately conduct themselves in terms of 
ethical decision-making.22 In the second paper, Professor Paula Schaefer 
of the University of Tennessee College of Law explores what behavioral 
science can tell us about the pressures and biases that may lead in-
house counsel to behave in ways that violate their ethical obligations, 
and that may ultimately harm their employers.23 
This Symposium would not have been possible without the hard 
work and dedication of the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law 
Review. Special thanks are due to Editor in Chief Rachel Ippolito and 
Executive Symposium Editor Emily Cunningham for their work in 
making the Symposium a success. Thank you also to Professors 
Jonathan Adler and Cassandra Burke Robertson for their assistance in 
organizing this event. 
 
20. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Pondering Financial 
Reporting: Remarks Before the 2018 Leet Business Law Symposium (Nov. 
2, 2018), in 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 849 (2019). 
21. Sean J. Griffith, Innovation in Disclosure-Based Shareholder Suits, 69 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 927 (2019). 
22. Hugh Gunz & Sally Gunz, Ethical Challenges in the Role of In-House 
Counsel, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 953 (2019). 
23. Paula Schaefer, Behavioral Legal Ethics Lesson for Corporate Counsel, 
69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 975 (2019).  
